Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Applied tariffs have declined steadily over the past two decades, having decreased from almost ten percent in 2000 to less than seven percent in 2015.
1 Nevertheless, the International Monetary Fund warns that protectionism is increasing and poses a threat to global economic growth (International Monetary Fund, 2017) . In particular, governments increasingly resort to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 2 with around 300 new measures implemented in 2014 alone. NTBs also play an increasing role in the design of trade agreements (Felbermayr, 2016; Felbermayr et al., 2017) , so that understanding their effects should be a key concern for policy makers.
Considering a broad range of government measures that lead to a discriminatory treatment of foreign competitors relative to domestic firms as an NTB, this paper exploits the recently updated Global Trade Alert (GTA) database, that collects information on protectionist policies. 3 We empirically quantify how bilateral trade flows change on average if at least one NTB is implemented. By estimating a structural gravity equation at the CPC 4 three-digit product level for 152 country pairs for the period 2010 to 2015, we find that bilateral import values of a particular product fall by 4% to 12% if at least one NTB is implemented by the importing country. This trade dampening effect is reduced if the importer and the exporter are engaged in a free trade agreement (FTA). Additionally, our estimations account for trade defence instruments (TDIs) such as anti-dumping duties.
This enables us to compare the trade dampening effects of NTBs and TDIs, showing that they are on average of similar size.
As NTBs can be very diverse, we distinguish four groups of NTBs: (1) import controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public procurement and localisation policies and (4) other NTBs, which include Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and capital controls. While we provide robust evidence that import controls reduce trade on average by 2% to 11%, the effect of the remaining NTBs is less pronounced.
Methodologically, our analysis contributes to the ongoing discussion on how to correctly identify the effect of NTBs that affect all trading partners equally. Most of the NTBs identified in the GTA database are so-called behind-the-border (BTB) measures.
1 Simple averages across all products and countries. Tariff data used in this paper is accessible via the World Integrated Trade Solution database provided by the World Bank and based on UNCTAD's TRAINS database as well as the WTO's IDB and CTS database.
2 See for example studies by Datt et al. (2011) , Evenett (2014) or Kee et al. (2013) . 3 The Global Trade Alert (GTA) database was launched in 2009 following the global financial crisis. The following analysis is based on the recent update published in July 2017.
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This means they are not targeted against specific trading partners but affect all trading partners equally. As soon as one accounts for importer-product-time fixed effects in a gravity equation, all variation within the BTB policy variable is absorbed. Hence, the effect of BTB measures on trade cannot be identified in a gravity equation with directional fixed effects. We apply a two-step estimation procedure following Head and Ries (2008) to identify the effect of BTB measures on trade and illustrate that such measures significantly reduce market access.
Our analysis relates to several strands of the trade literature. Regarding studies that examine how the overall level of NTBs affects trade, Kee et al. (2009) construct an overall restrictiveness index for over 70 developed and developing countries. The authors estimate ad valorem tariff equivalents to facilitate a direct comparison between the restrictiveness of NTBs and tariffs. They find that on average, NTBs contribute almost as much to trade restrictions as tariffs. According to Niu et al. (2017) , even though tariffs have generally fallen between 1997 and 2015, the increase in the use of NTBs has meant that the overall level of protection for countries and products has not decreased. Hoekman and Nicita (2011) find that on average trade decreases more strongly if NTBs are implemented rather than tariffs. More specifically, trade decreases on average by 1.7% if the level of NTBs increases by 10%. Similar ad valorem tariff equivalents are calculated by Bouët et al. (2008) and Bratt (2017) . We contribute to the literature by showing that the trade dampening impact of NTBs is mitigated by FTAs. Methodologically, we apply an extensive fixed effects setup to capture most sources of omitted variable bias.
With regard to the studies examining the effects of specific types of NTBs, a large strand of literature investigates the effects of TBT as well as SPS on trade. 5 Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) use a gravity model in order to investigate the intensive as well as extensive margin effects of SPS on agricultural and food trade. They find that SPS reduce the probability of exporting to a protected market but increase exports of incumbents, indicating that they serve as a barrier to market entry. Beestermöller et al. (2017) look at food safety border inspections, examining how the risk of rejection at European borders on safety grounds affects Chinese agri-food exporters. The authors find that inspections affect both entry to and exit from the European market as well as the value of incumbent exports. Ghodsi et al. (2017) liberalising or a protectionist impact, a distinction we are able to make with the GTA data.
This paper adds to the literature by comparing the protectionist impact of several different types of NTBs beyond those used in previous studies, showing that some measures affect trade more strongly than others.
NTBs can be measured directly or indirectly (Chen and Novy, 2012) . If NTBs are directly measured, information about the actual incidence of an NTB is used to construct counts, coverage or frequency ratios. This allows to distinguish different types of NTBs (Henn and McDonald, 2014; Ghodsi et al., 2017) . The indirect approach exploits information from market anomalies, such as price gaps or unexpectedly large or small trade flows to estimate the effects of NTBs (Andriamananjara et al., 2004; Bradford, 2003; Ferrantino, 2006) . However, the identification of a single type of NTB is not feasible (Ederington and Ruta, 2016 ). Since we aim to disentangle different trade effects for varying types of NTBs, we use the direct approach.
The greatest disadvantage of using the direct measurement approach is that data on NTBs is still relatively scarce. We use the recently updated GTA database, which collects protectionist policies that were implemented worldwide since 2009. One reason for using the database is that it covers a broad range of policy measures, identifying those that discriminate against non-domestic firms. Disadvantages include its reliance on government transparency as well as the absence of detailed information on the number of product lines (HS8 or HS10) covered within a product category. The merits and drawbacks of the database are discussed in detail in Section 3. Due to such data limitations, the results of this paper should thus be seen as complementing existing studies that rely on different databases.
Most studies that use data on NTBs from the GTA database either focus on determinants of protectionism (Georgiadis and Graeb, 2016) or restrict their study to a specific protectionist measure or region (Shingal, 2009; Evenett, 2014) . To the best of our knowledge, Henn and McDonald (2014) Henn and McDonald (2014) , who look at trade flows that were still largely affected by the world economic crisis.
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that trade flows do not immediately react to newly implemented trade barriers. Therefore, having the possibility to analyse yearly and not monthly trade flows as done by Henn and McDonald (2014) might capture the impact of NTBs on trade more accurately. The information on the types of products targeted by each measure is now available at the CPC three-digit level instead of the CPC two-digit level.
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A further strand of related literature is concerned with effects of BTB measures on trade. BTB measures do not vary by exporter and hence, they are absorbed in a gravity setting by importer-product-time fixed effects. Henn and McDonald (2014) address this problem by constructing dyads and tetrads of trade flows, which represent changes in imports relative to a reference importer and exporter. They argue that variation among exporters would be preserved particularly in cases where the reference exporter is not affected by protectionism in a certain import market, while most other exporters are subject to such protectionism. However, even if not all exporters are affected equally, it is difficult to anticipate which exporter is affected least and to assign treatment to different exporters accordingly.
Three alternative solutions have been suggested in the recent related literature: First, instead of including the full set of fixed effects into the regression, one could use proxies to account for multilateral resistance (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009 ). However, Yotov et al. (2016) do not recommend relying on remoteness indices, as they cannot account for all multilateral resistances and therefore still lead to biased estimates.
A second solution is to extend international trade data with intra-national trade data. This is done by Heid et al. (2015) to identify the effect of non-discriminatory trade policies on trade. By adding intra-national trade, BTB measures become bilateral by definition and thus can be identified. The major issue here is that intra-national trade data is not yet available for all years and all countries considered in this analysis. The databases available to construct intra-national trade (i.e. databases that include bilateral trade and production data) do only cover data until 2004 (the World Bank's Trade Production and
8 Section 2 provides details on the estimation strategy. 9 Data is also available at the HS six-digit product level. However, the affected HS six-digit product code is systematically missing for a subset of observations. See Section 3 for details.
Protection database) or 2006 (CEPII's TradeProd database).
The third alternative suggested by Head and Mayer (2014) , Egger and Nigai (2015) and Yotov et al. (2016) is to estimate the effect of BTB measures in two steps. In the first step the gravity equation is estimated with the full set of fixed effects. In the second step the predicted importer-product-time fixed effects from the first stage are regressed on importer-specific determinants to assess their impact on the importer's market access.
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Head and Mayer's derivation neglects the time dimension, as the model is assumed to hold in all time periods. In addition, the two-step estimator is only derived at the importerexporter dimension. We extend the model by Head and Mayer (2014) model to the product level. In doing so, we are close to Anderson and Yotov (2016) , who also use a two-step procedure, regressing estimates of importer-exporter-product fixed effects on BTB measures.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. An overview of the data used is given in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main findings, followed by some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Estimation Strategy
We estimate a structural gravity equation based on Yotov et al. (2016) and extend it to the product level as proposed by . Modelling the gravity equation explicitly with tariffs allows the estimates to be interpreted as trade elasticities.
This enables a direct comparison of the trade effect caused by NTBs and by tariffs. For each trade policy parameter tariff equivalents can be estimated . Extending the gravity model to the product level avoids potential underestimation of the effects of NTBs. NTBs are mostly targeted at specific products and do not target all imported or exported goods. The sectoral gravity equation captures all inter-sectoral linkages so that it accounts for substitution effects across different goods. The gravity equation derived by is given by
where X k ij are exports of product k from country i to country j. The equation can be decomposed into two terms that determine trade flows: The size effect and the trade costs effect. any trade costs large producers will export more to all destinations. Secondly, bigger or richer markets will import more from all origins. And thirdly, bilateral trade flows will be larger, the more similar two countries are in size.
The remaining term (
−σ k ) reflects the effect of trade costs on bilateral trade flows. t k ij contains all bilateral trade costs at the product level. These are factors like distance, a common language or a shared border, but also NTBs. P k j is defined as the inward multilateral resistance. It reflects importer j's market access, which depends on economic size and bilateral trade costs. π k i is defined as the outward multilateral resistance and thus reflects the exporter i's market access. Similar to the inward multilateral resistance, outward multilateral resistance also depends on domestic production and bilateral trade costs. It is assumed that both, inward and outward multilateral resistance terms are product specific. Finally, τ k ij are product specific trade costs induced by tariffs. All trade costs are assumed to have negative effects on trade. σ k is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of good k (assumed > 1).
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Identification of the Trade Effects of Non-Tariff Barriers
To empirically identify the effects of NTBs, we exploit the fact that for each implemented NTB, the GTA database contains the following information: Trading partners that are most likely affected, products that are affected (at CPC three-digit product level) and the date of implementation of any measure. We use this information to construct a dummy variable which equals one if at least one NTB is implemented between a destination country j and an origin country i that affects a product k at time t. Similar, a count variable is constructed, which counts how many NTBs are implemented between a country pair that affect product k at time t. For a more detailed analysis we split NTBs into four groups: (1) import controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public procurement and localisation policies and (4) other NTBs, which include SPS, TBT and capital controls. We estimate how imports change in response to NTBs from 2010 to 2015 using the 11 For more detailed information on the individual components of the gravity equation the reader is referred to Yotov et al. (2016) and .
following equation:
where X ijkt are bilateral trade flows in thousand USD from country i to country j at product level k and time t. N T B ijkt−1 identifies NTBs imposed by the importing country j against exporting country i and either consists of a dummy or count variable. 12 T DI ijkt−1 does the same for TDIs. Tariffs are included in logarithmic form (ln(1 + t ijkt−1 )), so that σ provides a direct estimate of the trade elasticity of tariffs. 13 λ ikt , γ jkt , θ ijk and µ ijt are exporter-product-time, importer-product-time, exporter-importer-product and exporterimporter-time fixed effects respectively. ijkt is the stochastic error term.
All trade policy variables are lagged by one year for two reasons: Firstly, NTBs and
TDIs are often implemented in reaction to an unexpected or rapid increase in imports. As we use annual trade data, our analysis cannot control for the exact date of implementation of each policy. Therefore, without lagging, the estimates might be biased towards zero, leading to an underestimation of the potentially negative treatment effect. Secondly, as argued by Ghodsi et al. (2017) , it is reasonable to assume that intermediate goods do
not react immediately to changes in trade costs. Using lags ensures that we account for changes in trade, which do not follow immediately, but only after some time of adaptation.
As this practice is not standard in the literature, contemporaneous trade policy variables are used in a robustness check, yielding similar results.
One major concern when estimating the gravity equation is to consistently account for multilateral resistance terms. We do so by including importer-product-time and exporterproduct-time fixed effects (Feenstra, 2015; Head and Mayer, 2014; Yotov et al., 2016) .
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects are included in order to absorb all time invariant bilateral trade costs at the product level such as distance, a shared border or specific industry linkages. Exporter-importer-time fixed effects control for unobserved variables such as FTAs and exchange rate movements. By controlling for all trade costs that vary across the same dimensions as NTBs, we can identify their causal effect on trade.
Given this identification, the estimated coefficient of the protectionist dummy can be interpreted as the average change in bilateral yearly-imports at the product level caused by the implementation of at least one protectionist policy by the importer. If counts 12 We use the year of implementation as the starting period and the year of removal as the end period. If the policy was still in place at the beginning of 2015, we set the end date to 2014, the last year covered in our dataset. Only measures that last for at least one year are included. constitutes an alternative method which treats all missing trade flows as zeros and assumes that these are statistical zeros, i.e. that the zeros occur randomly (Head and Mayer, 2014) . As Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show, applying the PPML estimator has the additional advantage that it accounts for heteroscedasticity in trade data. 14 PPML is hence our preferred estimation method. It is estimated in Stata using the command "ppmlhdfe" (Correia et al., 2018a,b) . OLS estimates are provided for comparison and are generated using the command "reghdfe" by Correia (2014 Correia ( , 2016 .
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Identification of the Trade Effects of Behind-the-Border Measures
The bilateral structure in the dataset is constructed. 16 Identifying which trading partners are likely to be affected from an NTB based on past trade flows might cause substantial endogeneity. In addition, many of the NTBs identified in the GTA database are typical BTB measures. This means that they are not targeted against specific trading partners, but affect all trading partners equally. As soon as one accounts for importer-producttime fixed effects in the gravity equation, all variation within the BTB policy variable is absorbed by the fixed effects.
14 Another solution to the problem of zero trade flows would be to estimate a Heckman selection model, which is a two-step model. It first estimates the likelihood that two economies trade with each other at a product line (extensive margin). Then it assesses the impact of trade policies in a second step conditional on the fact that two economies trade with each other. Alternatively, Tobit models could be estimated, which assume that trade flows are not randomly missing (Head and Mayer, 2014) . However, these models are biased if trade costs are heteroscedastic. A third alternative would be a two-part PPML model which specifically deals with non-random selection into positive exports (Egger et al., 2011) .
15 For the OLS estimation Equation 2 is log-linearised, so that it takes an additive form. 16 See Section 3 below.
We follow the two-step procedure suggested by Head and Mayer (2014) , Egger and Nigai (2015) and Yotov et al. (2016) to correctly identify the effect of BTB measures on trade, extending Head and Mayer's model to the product level. In the first stage, import values are regressed on TDIs, tariffs, an FTA dummy, exporter-importer-product, exporter-product-time and importer-product-time fixed effects, but without a dummy identifying NTBs. In order to store importer-product-time fixed effects, we rely on the command "ppml panel sg" by . 17 All NTBs are treated as BTB measures and are thus absorbed by the importer-product-time fixed effects. TDIs and tariffs, which vary across all four dimensions, remain in the estimation equation. The first stage is estimated using the PPML estimator and takes the following form:
In the second stage the predicted importer-product-time fixed effects from the first stage are regressed on BTB measures to assess their impact on the importer's market access.
We hence assess how importer-specific trade costs on average change, if at least one BTB measure is implemented. The second stage is a linear estimation. The importer-producttime fixed effect can be split into unobserved and observed country-product-time specific determinants (γ jkt = α jkt + βBT B jkt ). In this study BTB measures are the observed determinants (BT B jkt ).
As noted by Yotov et al. (2016) , directional fixed effects do not only absorb all multilateral resistances, but also all economic size terms, like production and expenditures.
Importer-fixed effects for example also control for differences across countries in the expenditure of domestic consumers. Therefore, we have to eliminate as many confounding factors as possible to capture a pure trade cost effect. We do so by including importerproduct, importer-time and product-time fixed effects. Importer-time fixed effects control for differences in economic size, which is an important determinant of importers' market access. The product-time fixed effects absorb changes in productivity which are product specific and vary over time. For example, this could be a new production technology that is adopted across all countries. Finally, importer-product fixed effects control for time invariant importer-product characteristics.
As Head and Mayer (2014) note, the importer-product-time fixed effects from the first stage are estimated with error (denoted as ν jkt ). This error is included in the error term of the second stage estimation. As the importer-product-time fixed effects are estimated with varying precision, the error term of the second stage can be heteroscedastic (Head and Mayer, 2014 
In the specific context of multilateral resistance, there may, however, be a drawback to using the two-step procedure. As noted by Fally (2015) , if a gravity equation is estimated using PPML, the estimated importer(-product-time) fixed effects can be represented as a function of the power transform of the corresponding inward multilateral resistance and national expenditure. Thus, in combination, the importer-product-time inward multilateral resistances and the importer-product-time expenditure will explain 100% of the importer-product-time fixed effects in specification (4). Therefore, in order to be able to identify the impact of country-specific BTB NTBs, we proceed with three alternative reduced-form specifications.
First, the multilateral resistance terms have an exact theoretical correspondence to the sum of trade costs, which include NTBs (as illustrated in Equation 1). The reduced form regression in Equation (4) hence offers some insights on how BTB barriers contribute to multilateral resistance and hence trade. In particular, the coefficients of the different types of NTBs inform about their relative importance in affecting market access. Second, building on Specification (4), we regress total imports directly on BTB barriers. Third, bilateral imports are regressed on BTB barriers, keeping in mind that we are unable to control for inward multilateral resistance in this specification. Taken together, the results provide additional evidence for the negative effect of BTB barriers on trade. If an official policy document states that a measure is targeted at the agricultural sector and no more detailed information on which types of products are affected could be gained, no affected products at the HS six-digit were identified. However, information about affected products at the CPC three-digit level is complete.
22 The large majority of NTBs are inward measures. In a robustness check we control for outward measures, which are implemented by the exporting country.
23 Data on NTBs is still relatively scarce. Most often, researchers rely on data from the TRAINS database, which is collectively published by the WTO, UNCTAD, ITC and the World Bank. It contains information about implemented NTBs at detailed HS six-digit product level, classified according to the UN MAST classification of NTBs. Another common source is the I-TIP database provided by the WTO in cooperation with UNCTAD. It also collects trade policies classified according to the UN MAST classification.
protectionism less likely. On the other hand, over-reporting is also unlikely as only measures that are either "implemented or whose future implementation is enacted" (Evenett and Fritz, 2018) are included in the dataset. To avoid downward bias resulting from the inclusion of measures that are not implemented in the end, this paper only considers measures for which the date of implementation is available. The set of policies covered is not predefined. Therefore, it can be expected that the GTA database covers a broader range of policies than other sources.
Second, the database clearly distinguishes between discriminatory and non discriminatory NTBs. The TRAINS database, which is one of the largest databases on non-tariff measures, does not make this distinction. In the TRAINS database this leads to multiple entries of SPS and TBT measures, which are not necessarily protectionist, but could also be trade enhancing. In contrast, each policy intervention that is included in the GTA database has to pass a six-step evaluation process. During this process it is evaluated whether the policy discriminates against foreign exporters to the benefit of domestic producers.
24 However, the GTA database does not include NTBs that primarily serve the "protection of human, animal or plant health or life" (Evenett and Fritz, 2018 Third, the definition of NTBs according to the GTA is not restricted to merely trade policies. The TRAINS database, as well as I-TIP restrict their collection of non-tariff measures to explicit trade policies. According to I-TIP, non-tariff measures are "defined as the measures subject to monitoring through notification under GATT-WTO agreements.
Measures that are not subject to monitoring are not considered". 25 As a consequence, these databases do not include state aid or bailout measures. However, especially this kind of hidden protectionism might play an increasingly important role for developed economies, as WTO regulations have reduced the scope to use standard trade policies to restrict trade. Lastly, the GTA database is superior to the Non-Tariff-Measure business surveys, which are published by the ITC. These surveys provide very detailed information on how specific non-tariff measures affect businesses. However, they are only conducted country-wide and are therefore not suitable for a cross-country comparison.
One major drawback of the GTA database, however, is that it only contains information on NTBs from 2009 onwards, so that no comparison with pre-crisis levels of protectionism is possible. In addition, its data collection method strongly relies on the transparency of governments publishing their policies online. For example, Saudi-Arabia was listed as the least protectionist country among the G20 economies in 2015. Only after its state development fund made information about all loans and financial grants given to domestic companies publicly available, it jumped to the seventh rank in 2016 (Evenett and Fritz, 2016) . Similarly, governments differ in how they announce policies. As noted by the GTA initiative, the US government tends to announce each policy separately, while
European governments tend to announce policies in bundles. The results do not, however, predict which of the two instruments would reduce imports of a targeted product by more.
A detailed overview of the types of NTBs included in this study is provided in (Hofmann et al., 2017 (Hofmann et al., , 2018 .
Data on bilateral imports is retrieved from BACI, which reports trade flows at the The world map in Figure 2 shows The world map in Figure 3 shows how often exporters from each country were likely to be affected by an NTB imposed by another country between 2009 and 2014. Canada, Germany and China are the three economies that were most often likely to be affected by 29 Most of the implemented NTBs from the United States are concentrated in the group of public procurement and localisation policies. They account for about 50% of all implemented measures worldwide. Similar, the United States is responsible for close to 40% of all state aid and subsidies measures. To a certain degree this extreme outlier might be driven by the fact that the US government tends to announce each policy separately, while for example European governments tend to announce policies in bundles. We provide a robustness check, excluding the United States from the estimation sample. Results are not driven by this outlier (see Table 3 where certain country-product pairs are affected by more than 10 NTBs simultaneously.
Overall, 2.6% of all importer-exporter-product-time combinations in the sample faced at least one NTB (Table A .2 in the Appendix). TDIs, including anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards, were implemented in 0.3% of all observations.
Estimation Results
Gravity Estimation Results
Baseline estimation results are reported in Table 1 . Columns (1) to (3) present results using the OLS estimator. According to the most general specification in Column (1), imports decrease on average by 11.8% following the implementation of at least one NTB.
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This effect is significant at the 1% level. TDIs have a similarly large effect on bilateral trade flows. On average, imports of a particular product from a targeted country fall by 7.6% if at least one TDI is implemented against this product. The coefficients are significantly different from each other (5%), indicating that NTBs have on average a larger trade dampening effect than traditional TDIs. As discussed in Section 3, this can be either due to differences in the effectiveness of the two measures or due to differences in coverage.
The estimated coefficient for tariffs is small and not statistically significant. This is not surprising since the extensive fixed effects strategy absorbs most variation in tariffs. Not controlling for exporter-importer-time fixed effects ( Column (3) of Table 1 reports effects for the four disaggregated measures for NTBs.
Estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all types of NTBs.
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT and capital controls) have the strongest negative impact on bilateral imports (-0.187). On average, bilateral imports of a particular product decrease by 17.1%, following the implementation of at least one SPS, TBT or capital control. In contrast, state aid and subsidies (-0.059) have the smallest negative impact on imports (-5.7%). Direct import controls and public procurement and localisation policies reduce trade by 10.6% and 15.5% respectively.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 show estimation results using the PPML estimator.
While the effect of tariffs on imports increases compared to the OLS estimates and becomes statistically significant, the estimated coefficients of TDIs and NTBs reported in Column (4) decrease in magnitude compared to the OLS estimates in Column (1). According to the PPML estimation results, bilateral imports on average decrease by 3.5%
if at least one NTB is implemented. For TDIs, the estimated coefficient decreases from -0.079 in the OLS estimation to -0.040 in the PPML estimation, predicting an average decrease in imports of 3.9% if at least one TDI is implemented. Both coefficients remain significant at the 1% level and are not significantly different from each other.
The larger NTB coefficient in Column (5) relative to Column (4) once again indicates that the effect of NTBs is stronger for imports from countries not sharing an FTA. However, the (positive) coefficient of the interaction term ceases to be statistically significant.
Looking at the disaggregate measures of NTBs (Column 6), it is evident that only public procurement and localisation policies as well as import controls significantly affect imports, with reported coefficients of -0.084 and -0.025, respectively. There is no evidence that state aid, subsidies and other NTBs affect trade flows.
In light of the literature on the determinants of the global trade slowdown (Constantinescu et al., 2018), the coefficients can be used in a back-of-the-envelope calculation to provide a rough estimate of how much NTBs have reduced overall trade. Given that 32.8% of export value in our sample was affected by at least one NTB in 2015, using the baseline coefficients of -0.125 (equivalent to a reduction of 11.8%, OLS) and -0.036 (3.5% reduction, PPML) yields a trade reduction of 1.1% -3.9% that can be attributed to NTBs.
Estimation results using counts instead of dummies are provided in Table 2 . Qualitatively, the results are similar to those provided in Table 1 . Column (1) of Table 2 shows that TDIs as well as NTBs both reduce imports. However, the coefficient for TDIs is now significantly larger than that for NTBs, indicating that each individual TDI reduces trade four times more than an NTB. This is also true in the PPML estimation (Column (4) of Table 2 ). However, as shown in Table A .2 in the Appendix, NTBs (113,725 cases) were applied about nine times as often as TDIs (12,432), explaining the difference in the aggregate effect. The coefficient of the interaction term (Columns 3 and 5) remains positive but is not statistically significant.
The results change when looking at the individual groups of NTBs (Column (3) of Table 2 ). The estimated coefficients for import controls, state aid and subsidies and other NTBs are significantly larger than the one for TDIs. The small aggregate effect is driven primarily by the small and insignificant coefficient of public procurement. The PPML estimates of the individual NTBs (Column 6) all become smaller in magnitude and lose significance relative to the OLS estimates. Note: All estimations include exporter-importer-product, importer-product-time, exporter-producttime and exporter-importer-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at exporter-importerproduct level. Variables for NTBs, TDIs and tariffs are lagged by one year. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as counts. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Robustness of the Baseline Results
To test whether results depend on the aggregation method for tariffs from the HS six-digit to the CPC three-digit product level, a robustness check carries out the baseline regressions with tariff rates weighted by trade value. The results for the OLS estimation are reported in Columns (1) and (2) averages of tariffs are used. Note: OLS regression with ln(imports in thousand USD) as dependent variable. All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time exporter-importer-time and exporterimporter-product fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at exporter-importer-product level. All variables for NTBs, TDIs and tariffs are lagged by one year. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Second, NTBs imposed by the exporting country might affect both its exports as well as the importing country's decision to impose NTBs. To avoid any omitted variable bias that may result from this relationship, we use an additional dummy to control for the existence of NTBs imposed by the exporter, targeting exports to the importing country.
The results are provided in Columns (3) and (4) (5) and (6) of Table 3 . All coefficients remain robust, indicating that the US is not driving the results.
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One explanation for the smaller coefficients when using PPML might be the fact that one adds a substantial amount of zero trade flows to the reference group (Anderson and Yotov, 2016) . We hence perform an additional robustness check, excluding all missing trade flows from the sample (rather than treating them as zeros). The results are reported in Columns (7) and (8) state aid and subsidies and FTAs reported in Column (4).
Our preferred specification uses lagged policy variables. As a robustness check, we perform the baseline regression using contemporaneous values for tariffs, NTBs and TDIs rather than lags. The results, reported in Table A .6 in the Appendix, remain similar to the baseline in both magnitude and significance. However, estimates for TDIs increase in magnitude while those for NTBs become smaller. This indicates that NTBs take longer than TDIs to unveil their full effect on trade.
In order to see effects over time, we regress trade on contemporaneous and lagged policy measures simultaneously. The results, reported in Table A .7 in the Appendix, reveal an interesting difference between TDIs and NTBs. Columns (1) and (3) show that the contemporaneous coefficient of TDIs is larger in magnitude than lagged TDIs (which are even insignificant in the PPML specification), providing further evidence that the main impact of TDIs on trade is realised in the year of implementation. In contrast, the coefficient for lagged NTBs is larger in magnitude than that of contemporaneous NTBs, indicating that their trade effects increases over time. The same is true for individual NTBs (Columns (2) and (4) of Table A.7). (2015), we re-run our baseline regression, clustering standard errors by exporter, importer, product and year, rather than by exporter-importerproduct. The results are presented in Table A .8 in the Appendix. Standard errors of NTBs increase but overall results remain robust. In particular, the estimated coefficients for NTBs remain strongly significant in all specifications. Their standard errors remain almost unchanged in the PPML specifications, while they even fall for the interaction between NTBs and FTA (Column 5), so that the coefficient becomes significant at the 5% level. Estimated coefficients for TDIs as well as import controls, however, turn insignificant in the PPML specifications.
Following Egger and Tarlea
Last but not least, we conduct a placebo test, regressing bilateral imports on future changes in NTBs, using two-year leads (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) .
35 The placebo test yields insignificant coefficients for tariffs and TDIs (Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.9 in the Appendix). However, estimated coefficients for NTBs are positive and significant. This is reasonable, as it underlines the argument that NTBs are implemented in response to increasing imports. Consequently, the estimated baseline coefficients are likely to be biased towards zero, hence constituting a lower bound of the true treatment effect. PPML results (reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table A .9 in the Appendix) are insignificant for the aggregate NTB measures. This can be taken as evidence that the PPML estimation suffers less from endogeneity between NTBs and imports and should therefore be the preferred specification. Finally we also conduct the placebo test using multi-way clustering of standard errors. Overall, this reduces the significance of coefficients further (Columns (5) to (8) of Table A .9 in the Appendix).
Unilateral Estimation Results
The constructed bilateral structure might bias estimation results for those NTBs that classify as BTB measures and affect all exporters equally. Keeping in mind the caveats discussed in Section 2, we address this issue by applying a two-step estimation procedure.
In the first step, We estimate a standard gravity equation which omits any NTBs. In the second step, we regress the predicted importer-product-time fixed effects from the first stage on importer-product specific NTBs to assess their contribution to importer-specific trade costs. 
ln ( Note: Dependent variable: Import value in thousand USD (1st Stage) and importer-product-time fixed effects (2nd stage). The 1st stage PPML estimation includes importer-product-time, exporter-producttime and exporter-importer-product fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at exporter-importerproduct level. The 2nd stage OLS estimations include importer-time, product-time and importer-product fixed effects. Standard errors are either clustered at country-product level or bootstrapped. All explanatory variables except for the FTA dummy are lagged by one year. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results for the first stage are shown in Column (1) of Table 4 . The coefficients for tariffs and TDIs remain similar to the baseline results in magnitude and significance. 36 In the second stage, importer-product-time fixed effects are regressed on a dummy indicating the existence of at least one NTB, controlling for importer-product, importer-time and product-time fixed effects. We assume that any implemented NTB affects all exporters equally and therefore we refer to it as BTB barrier. 37 The estimated coefficient can be interpreted as the average change in importer market access caused by at least one implemented NTB. Due to the potential heterogeneity contained in the error term from the predicted fixed effects from the first stage we report standard errors once clustered at the importer-product level and once bootstrapped.
38
Results of the second stage regression are reported in Columns (2) to (5) of Table 4 .
Importer-product market access on average decreases by 2.3% following the implementation of at least one BTB measure (Columns 2 and 3). This effect is significant at the 5% level regardless of whether standard errors are clustered at importer-product level or bootstrapped. Looking at the disaggregated measures of NTBs (Columns 4 and 5) it becomes clear that the aggregate effect is driven by import controls. While these findings confirm the baseline result that NTBs in general and import controls in particular negatively affect trade, they do not offer evidence that all types of NTBs are effective in reducing imports.
Following the discussion in Section 2, we use the two-step structure to conduct additional robustness checks. First, rather than running the regression in two steps, Equation (4) can be plugged in directly into Equation (3). κ kt and ζ jk drop out because they are already nested in λ ikt , and θ ijk . Only η jt remains. Recall that the variable BT B jkt does not vary at the exporter dimension any longer, as NTBs are assumed to affect all exporters equally. TDIs and tariffs enter as before. The results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table A .10 in the Appendix. The estimated coefficient for BTB NTBs is smaller 36 Importer-product-time fixed effects are predicted using the gen(M) option of the ppml panel sg command from stata. The gen(M) option produces exponentiated importer-product-time fixed effects . Therefore, we use the logarithm of the predicted fixed effects in the second stage as the dependent variable. Taking the logarithm excludes all fixed effects that are zero. This is not problematic since fixed effects of the value zero do only occur, if an importer did not import any goods of a respective product at time t. After taking the logarithm, the predicted fixed effects vary between -22.9 and 15.53. The average predicted fixed effect is -0.97. 147,667 non-zero fixed effects are predicted.
37 By making this assumption the constructed bilateral structure of the GTA dataset becomes irrelevant. The sample size naturally is much smaller than in the first stage, as the exporter-dimension is dropped. In total 147,667 observations are included.
38 If the bootstrapping method is used, the estimation is repeated 100 times for different draws from the estimation sample. Each time a sample of the same size of the estimation sample is drawn. Observations can be included more than once in the drawn sample. Bootstrapping ensures that standard errors are estimated consistently. than in the baseline, but has a similar magnitude to that of the 2nd stage results. The difference with respect to the baseline is not surprising. If not all countries are affected by NTBs, treating all exporters as treated leads to an underestimation of the treatment effect.
In a further step, importer-time fixed effects are replaced by importer-exporter-time fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) of Table A .10 show that estimated coefficients remain robust to this more restrictive specification. Finally, rather than investigating how BTB NTBs affect the importer's market access, it is possible to check directly how BTB NTBs affect aggregate imports of affected products across all exporters. To do so, the exporter dimension is dropped and imports at the importer-product-time dimension are regressed on average tariffs and a BTB NTB dummy.
39 Regression results are presented in Columns (5) and (6) of Table A .10. The estimated coefficient of BTB NTBs is negative and significant in the PPML specification, providing further evidence that BTB measures negatively impact trade.
Conclusion
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that NTBs significantly decrease the level of When looking at individual NTBs, it is demonstrated that import controls significantly reduce imports across all specifications. Specifically, the implementation of one additional import control reduces trade by 2% to 8%, so that imports fall on average by 2% to 11% if at least one import control is implemented. Public procurement and localisation policies have an even larger average effect (8% to 16%), although evidence is less robust when it comes to marginal effects of one additional such policy. State aid and subsidies as well as other NTBs (SPS, TBT and capital controls) also reduce imports by up to 6% and 17% respectively, even though their effect is less robust to changes in the estimation method.
Methodologically, this study applies a two-step estimation procedure to identify trade effects caused by BTB measures. The two-step estimation confirms that non-standard trade policies are important determinants of the trade costs faced by the importer. Implementing at least one BTB measure that discriminates all exporters equally on average reduces market access of the importer by 2%.
Overall, the paper illustrates the importance of exploiting new data on NTBs to reveal the significant protectionist impact of non-standard trade policies, which can however be mitigated through FTAs. The results imply that the WTO should follow recent developments in bilateral trade agreements. More precisely, it should shift its focus towards multilateral agreements that aim at limiting the use of NTBs to avoid the increase in hidden protectionism that might otherwise result in lower levels of trade. Note: All estimations include exporter-importer-product, importer-producttime, exporter-product-time and exporter-importer-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at exporter-importer-product level. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: All estimations include exporter-importer-product, importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and exporterimporter-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by exporter-importer-product (Columns 1 -4) or exporter, importer, product and year (Columns 5 -8). Variables for NTBs, TDIs and tariffs are leading two years. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: All estimations include exporter-importer-product, importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and exporter-importer-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by exporter-importer-product (Columns 1 -4) or importer-product (Columns 5 -6). Variables for NTBs, TDIs and tariffs are lagged by one year. Except for tariffs all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
